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State Aid as a Tool to Achieve Technology
Neutrality
Annotation on the Judgment of the General Court of the European Union
(Fifth Chamber) of 26 November 2015 in Case T-541/13 Abertis Telecom,
SA and Retevisión I, SA v Commission
Pablo Ibáñez Colomo*
In Abertis (a representative judgment of a saga of similar cases), the General Court dismissed
an action for annulment against a Commission decision finding that the measures in sup-
port for the deployment of a digital terrestrial television network in Spain amounted to un-
lawful and incompatible State aid. According to the Commission, the support measures were
not granted in accordance with the principle of technology neutrality, insofar as they exclud-
ed technologies such as satellite. In addition, it held that the Member State could not invoke
the Altmark case law, or Article 106(2) TFEU, insofar as the operators had not been entrust-
ed with a public service mission. This is so in spite of the fact that the Spanish Telecommu-
nications Act explicitly referred to the transmission of broadcasting signals as a service of
general economic interest. The analysis of the Commission was, by and large, validated by
the General Court. The appeal against the judgment, in this and in similar cases, is current-
ly pending.
Keywords: SGEI; Altmark; Technology Neutrality; Networks.
I. Introduction
Technology neutrality is enshrined in EU law. It was
one of the fundamental guiding principles of the
EURegulatory Framework for electronic communi-
cations.1 When this legislative package was adopt-
ed in 2002, the process of technological conver-
gence was already well under way. As a result, ca-
ble television networks could be used for the provi-
sion of telecommunications services and, converse-
ly, legacy telecommunications infrastructure can be
used to provide audiovisual content. The two indus-
tries – telecommunications and audiovisual – have
been transformed in the course of the past decades
by digitisation. Against this background, telecom-
munications regulation was re-crafted to ensure
that remedial action by authorities would not dis-
criminate by favouring some technologies over oth-
ers.2
By and large, audiovisual activities are left outside
the scope of the EU Regulatory Framework.3 Thus,
the principle of technology neutrality to television
and related activities has found its way through oth-
er instruments. As this annotation reveals, State aid
law has become one of them. The Commission has
made use of its powers to enforce Articles 107(1) and
108(3) TFEU to take action against regulation which,
it believes, discriminates among technologiesused for
the transmission of audiovisual services and amounts
to the award of State aid. An obvious example in this
sense isMediaset, where the Commission challenged
the award of subsidies to end-users for the acquisition
of digital decoders insofar as satellite transmissions
* Department of Law, London School of Economics and Political
Science. E-mail: P.Ibanez-Colomo@lse.ac.uk.
1 See in particular the Directive 2002/20/EC of the European
Parliament and the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks
and services, as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC [2002] OJ
L108/33, hereinafter ‘the Framework Directive’.
2 Ibid, Article 8(1), which refers to the “desirability of making
regulations technologically neutral”.
3 Ibid, Article 2(b), which leaves outside of its scope “services
providing, or exercising editorial control over, content transmitted
using electronic communications networks and services”.
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were excluded from the measure.4 The judgment of
theGeneral Court (hereinafter ‘GC’) inAbertis,5which
is taken as a representative example of a saga of sim-
ilar cases, provides another example of this trend. The
judgment is of particular interest insofar as it engages
with the idea that technology neutrality is a general
principle of EU law and one that Member States
should respect as a rule. The analysis of the Commis-
sion suggests that the operation of a service of gener-
al economic interest (hereinafter ‘SGEI’) within the
meaning of Article 106(2) TFEU presupposes the
adoption of technologically neutral regulation. This
position is remarkable considering the discretion that
Member States enjoy in this regard. Even though this
understanding of the principle of technology neutral-
ity was not entirely validated, the GC dismissed the
action for annulment in its entirety. At the time of the
preparation of this annotation, the appeal brought by
the applicants before the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union (hereinafter ‘the Court’) is pending.6
II. Regulatory Background
The background to the judgment in Abertis is a se-
ries ofmeasures adopted by the Spanish government
in the context of the digitisation of the transmission
of terrestrial television services. Their origin can be
traced back to Law 10/2005 on Urgent Measures for
the Promotion of Digital Terrestrial Television, Lib-
eralisation of Cable TV and Support of Pluralism.7
Other related measures include Royal Decree
944/2005 approving the General Regulations for the
delivery of digital terrestrial television service;8 Or-
der ITV 2476/2005; and Royal Decree 920/2006.9 For
technical reasons, the process of digitisation requires
the adaptation of the network used for the transmis-
sionof terrestrial signals.The technical challengewas
addressed in Spain by dividing up the territory in
three areas:
– Area I, covering 96% of the Spanish territory (for
private terrestrial broadcasters) and 98% (for pub-
lic service operators) was not deemed to require
the award of subsidies of similar measures, as the
costs were born by the broadcasters themselves;
– Area II covers 2.5% of the territory that was tradi-
tionally reached by terrestrial television but that
required important investments to ensure the suc-
cessful transition to digital transmissions; and
– Area III, which covers the remaining 1.5% of the
Spanish territory and for which terrestrial televi-
sion was ruled out as unworkable.
On thebasis of the legislative instrumentsmentioned
above, several Spanish regional and local authorities
supported the development of the digital terrestrial
network within Area II. These measures were con-
tested by SES Astra, a satellite operator, which filed
a complaint before the European Commission (here-
inafter ‘theCommission’). Pursuant to the complaint,
the plan for the transition to digital amounted to un-
lawful State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1)
TFEU. The fundamental claim of the satellite opera-
tor was that the legislative measures had excluded
other means of transmission. The Commission
opened the formal investigation procedure in
September 2010, and adopted its decision on 19 June
2013.10 It found the measures in support of the tran-
4 Case C-403/10 P Mediaset SpA v Commission [2011]
ECLI-533.
5 Case T-541/13 Abertis Telecom, SA and Retevisión I, SA v Com-
mission [2015] ECLI-898. This judgment is one of a saga of paral-
lel challenges against a Commission decision. See Case T-461/13
Spain v Commission [2015] ECLI-891; Case T-462/13 Comunidad
Autónoma del País Vasco and Itelazpi v Commission [2015]
ECLI-902; Joined Cases T-463/13 and 464/13 Comunidad Autóno-
ma de Galicia and Retegal v Commission [2015] ECLI-901; Case
T-465/13 Comunidad Autónoma de Cataluña and CTTI [2015]
ECLI-900; Case T-487/13 Navarra de Servicios y Tecnologías
[2015] ECLI-899.
6 Case C-69/16 P Cellnex Telecom and Retevisión I v Commission,
pending. See also, other challenges have been brought against the
GC judgments dismissing challenges brought against the Com-
mission decision. See, Case C-66/16 P Comunidad Autónoma del
País Vasco and Itelazpi v Commission, pending; Case C-67/16 P
Comunidad Autónoma de Cataluña and CTTI v Commission,
pending; Case C-68/16 P Navarra de Servicios y Tecnologías v
Commission, pending; Case C-70/16 P Comunidad Autónoma de
Galicia v Commission, pending; Case C-81/16 P Spain v Commis-
sion, pending.
7 Law 10/2005, available at <https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id
=BOE-A-2005-10069> Last accessed on 21 September 2016.
8 Royal Decree 944/2005, available at <https://www.boe.es/diario
_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2014-9667> Last accessed on 21
September 2016.
9 Royal Decree 920/2006, available at <https://www.boe.es/boe/
dias/2006/09/02/pdfs/A31532-31538.pdf> Last accessed on 21
September 2016.
10 State aid implemented by the Kingdom of Spain for the deploy-
ment of digital terrestrial television in remote and less urbanised
areas, European Commission, Decision 2014/489/EU of 19 June
2013 OJ L/217/52. A second decision concerning the Spanish
region of Castilla-La Mancha would follow. See State aid imple-
mented by the authorities of Castilla-La Mancha for the deploy-
ment of digital terrestrial television in remote and less urbanised
areas European Commission, Decision 2016/1385 of 1 October
2014 [2016] OJ L222/52.
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sition to digital terrestrial television (hereinafter
‘DTT’) to amount to incompatible State aid insofar
as they were adopted in breach of the principle of
technology neutrality. It ordered the recovery of the
sums awarded in breach of Article 108(3) TFEU.
III. Commission Decision
In its decision, theCommission presented the legisla-
tive instruments adopted by the central government
and the measures implemented at the regional and
local level as forming the basis of the same scheme.11
Similarly, it did not dispute that the measures glob-
ally made a technological choice in favour of DTT. In
support of this conclusion, the Commission argued
that the primary legislative instrument refers explic-
itly to terrestrial transmission and to the fact that the
vastmajority of tenders organised at the regional lev-
el for the implementation of the plan of the central
government were also awarded to project relying up-
on terrestrial technologies.12 Another question that
did not leave any scope for discussion in the Com-
mission’s view is the involvement of State resources
in the measures.13 As opposed to a mere transfer
within authorities, the measures ultimately benefit-
ted the operators of terrestrial networks.
Moredetailedwas theanalysis ofwhether themea-
sures granted a selective advantage to the said oper-
ators. In this regard, the Commission noted that the
network operators benefitted either directly or indi-
rectly from the transfer of State resources aimed at
the expansion or the upgrading of the network. Aber-
tis and Retevisión, as the main operators of DTT in-
frastructures in Spain, were understood to be the
main beneficiaries of the plans of the Spanish gov-
ernment.14However, they were not deemed to be the
only recipients of aid. In some regions, public under-
takings were entrusted with the mission of extend-
ing the coverage of the network.15 The measures
were, in addition, deemed to be selective insofar as
they only benefitted firms operating terrestrial trans-
mission infrastructure in the broadcasting sector.16
The crucial – and most interesting in theory and
practice – issue relates to whether the contentious
measures met the conditions set out by the Court in
Altmark17 and/or whether they qualified as an SGEI
within the meaning of Article 106(2) TFEU. The ex-
ample of the Basque country was put forward as an
exampleby theSpanishgovernment.18 In this regard,
theCommissionargued that themeasuresdonot con-
form to the first Altmark condition, that is, that the
recipient undertakings are entrusted with a set of
well-defined public service obligations.19 On the one
hand, it is acknowledged in thedecision that telecom-
munications services – a legal concept that compris-
es the operation of terrestrial networks – are services
of general economic interest in accordance with na-
tional legislation. On the other hand, the Commis-
sion considered that transmission activities are not
as such defined as a public service in the Spanish
Telecommunications Act of 2003. In addition, it con-
cluded that the relevant legislation does not specifi-
cally refer to terrestrial transmission as an SGEI.20
The fourth Altmark condition was not deemed to be
fulfilled either.21
The Commission also rejected arguments relating
to the compatibility of the measures with Articles
107(3) and 106(2) TFEU. As far as the first is con-
cerned, the decision did not dispute that the mea-
sures sought to address a well-defined objective that
is in the common interest and that there is a market
failure in the industry that could have the effect of
depriving a significant part of the population from
access digital television. However, the Commission
concluded that intervention by the Spanish govern-
ment took place in breach of the principle of technol-
ogy neutrality.22 It is worth noting in this regard that
the decision is based on the idea that this is a princi-
ple of general application in EUState aid law.Accord-
ing to the Commission, tenders such as the one at
stake in the case should be technologically neutral,
unless there is ex ante evidence suggesting that only
one technology could have been selected.23 As far as




15 Ibid., [101, 105].
16 Ibid., [113].
17 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium
Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, and Ober-
bundesanwalt beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht [2003] ECLI-415.
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Article 106(2) TFEU is concerned, the Commission
noted that it is not applicable in the case for the same
reasons that theAltmark conditionswerenot deemed
to be fulfilled.24
IV. Judgment
Several challenges, by private firms and public au-
thorities, were brought against the decision adopted
by the Commission.25 The challenge brought by
Abertis and Retevisión raised four main pleas in law,
one relating to the qualification of the measures as
State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU;
one relating to their qualification as newaid; and two
concerning the assessment of the compatibility of
the measures with the internal market. These pleas
were dismissed in their entirety by the GC, and the
applicantswere ordered to pay the costs. The remain-
der of this annotation focuses on the analysis of the
conditions set out in Article 107(1) TFEU – in particu-
lar in relation to the application of the Altmark con-
ditions to the facts of the case – and on the analysis
of the compatibility of the measures with the inter-
nal market.
1. Qualification of the Measures as Aid
Abertis and Retevisión argued that the Commission
erred in law by failing to conclude that the measures
fulfilled the conditions set in Altmark. The analysis
of the GC starts by noting the discretion that Mem-
ber States enjoy when deciding which activities are
to be entrusted with public service obligations, and
the fact that the Commission is only entitled to call
into question the qualification of an activity as an
SGEIwhere there is amanifest error of assessment.26
Themarginal control ofMember States’ choices com-
prises, in particular, the definition of an SGEI oblig-
ation.27 In this regard, the GC rejected the arguments
of the applicants, insofar as their activity – the oper-
ation of a DTT network at the national level – had
not been defined as an SGEI within the meaning of
EU law.
In this regard, the GC dismisses the idea that the
express designation of an activity as an SGEI in na-
tional legislation is sufficient to satisfy the first Alt-
mark condition, or Article 106(2) TFEU. The judg-
ment suggests, in line with the position of the Com-
mission, that the meaning attached to the notion of
SGEI in the Spanish Telecommunications Act differs
from the understanding of the notion in EU law. In
particular, it points out that the Spanish legislation
refers to the provision of services in a freely compet-
itive market, as opposed to the entrustment of spe-
cific undertakings with the public service obligation,
as required, in its view, by Altmark.28 In addition, it
holds (as the Commission did in its decision) that the
contentious measures are at odds with the logic of
Spanish Telecommunications Act, which endorsed
the principle of technology neutrality.29 The GC also
concluded that nothing in the instruments adopted
by regional or local authorities, other than theBasque
Country, suggested that the network operators had
been entrusted with a mission in the public inter-
est.30
The GC also upholds the Commission arguments
relating to the difference to be drawn between the
provision of broadcasting services, which would
qualify as a public service in accordance with the rel-
evant legislation, and the operation of the transmis-
sion infrastructure.31 The fourth argument related to
the principle of technology neutrality as such. Ac-
cording to Abertis and Retevisión, a proper analysis
of the question would have considered whether the
choice of a particular technology is manifestly incor-
rect.32 In the absence of a manifest error, in other
words, a breach of the principle of technology neu-
tralitywouldnotbe sufficient toqualify themeasures
as State aid. The GC – and this is a remarkable aspect
of the judgment – appears to suggest that, as a rule,
Member States need to consider the principle of tech-
nology neutrality where they designate an activity as
an SGEI.33 At the same time, it holds that, in the spe-
cific context of this case, the Commission had not es-
24 Ibid., [172].
25 See above, (n5). The challenge against the decision concerning
Castilla-La Mancha is still pending before the GC. See Case
T-38/15 Telecom Castilla-La Mancha v Commission, pending and
above, (n10).
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tablished to the requisite legal standard that a man-
ifest error had been committed on the part of the
MemberState.34 In spiteof this fact, theGCconcludes
that the first Altmark condition is not met in the ab-
sence of a clear and precise entrustment of an SGEI
obligation.35 As a result, no error of law had been
committedby theCommissionwhenconcluding that
the measure gave a selective advantage to the opera-
tors of the terrestrial network.36 For the same rea-
sons, the GC rules out the applicability of decision
2012/21 to the case.37
2. Compatibility Assessment
The principle of technology neutrality played an im-
portant role in the assessment of the compatibility
of the measure with the internal market. In this re-
gard, the GC holds that the applicants failed to estab-
lish that the Commission had committed a manifest
error when concluding that the measures could not
be justified insofar as theywere at oddswith theprin-
ciple of technology neutrality.38 The GC also rejects
arguments seeking to show that terrestrial technolo-
gy was the most effective and the most appropriate
in Spain, given the economic and legal context in
which broadcasters operate. In this regard, it con-
cludes that none of the reports produced by the par-
ties in support of their conclusions showed that the
compatibility assessment of the Commission was
manifestly incorrect.39 It also rejects the arguments
claiming that competition had not been distorted
within themeaning of Article 107(3)(c).40 Finally, the
GC rules that the measures could not be qualified as
an existing aid in view of the transformation that the
sector and themeasures adopted to support the trans-
mission across the whole territory had undergone.41
V. Analysis
The GC ruling is remarkable in that it engages with
two questions that are only controlled for manifest
errors and that overlap, at least to some extent, with
one another. This is a factor that complicates consid-
erably the analysis. On the one hand, Member States
enjoy discretion when designating some activities as
SGEIs. As a result, one would expect Member States’
choices in this sense to be challenged, or second-
guessed, in relatively exceptional circumstances, in-
cluding in the context of Article 106(2) TFEU. On the
other hand, the assessment of the compatibility of
State aid by the Commission is only subject to limit-
ed review by the EU courts. As a result, its decisions
finding the incompatibility of a measure with the in-
ternal market can only be expected to be annulled by
the EU courts in exceptional circumstances, includ-
ing – again – in the context of Article 106(2) TFEU.42
In Abertis, this overlap has been decided in favour of
the Commission. This outcome may be perceived as
counterintuitive if one considers that it is for the au-
thority to show that the conditions of Article 107(1)
TFEU are met and that a justification only comes in-
to play once it is established that the measure
amounts to State aid. The outcome, however, may be
explained by the way in which the GC interpreted
the scope of the ‘manifest error’ test.
The judgment appears to be based on the idea that
there are some matters relating to SGEIs over which
Member States do not enjoy discretion. The GC in-
deed suggests that the entrustment of an undertak-
ing with a public service mission, and the general
economic nature of the service are not merely con-
trolled for manifest errors, but can be fully reviewed
by the Commission and courts. It is particularly no-
table that the Spanish Telecommunications Act ex-
pressly recognised the activities as an SGEI but the
Member Statewas not given any leeway in this sense.
The reference in legislation to the nature of the ser-
vice was deemed insufficient to conclude that terres-
trial network operators had been entrusted with a
public servicemission. In this sense, theCommission
distinguished between the two, even though they are
generally understood to be synonymous concepts, in









42 A statistical analysis performed by this author confirms this view.
In the period between 2004 and 2011, no single decision was
found to be annulled by the EU courts on grounds that the com-
patibility assessment was incorrect. See P Ibáñez Colomo, ‘State
Aid Litigation before EU Courts (2004-2012): A Statistical
Overview’ (2013) 4 Journal of European Competition Law and
Practice 469.
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notion of public service as used in national legal sys-
tems.43
This is a question that will be addressed by the
Court as it is the single point of law raised by the ap-
pellants.44 They argue, inter alia, that the GC erred
in law by ‘exceeding the boundaries’ of the ‘manifest
error’ test and by ‘failing to recognise’ that the defi-
nition and the entrustment of an SGEI does not re-
quire a particular instrument or formula. These are
questions that have already been abundantly exam-
ined by the Court – and, to a large extent, appeared
to have been long settled in the case law – but that
will be revisited on appeal. One of the most intrigu-
ing aspects of the decision concerns the argument
raised by the Commission whereby the technologi-
cally neutral wording of the Spanish Telecommuni-
cations Act precludes the qualification of the activi-
ties at stake in the case as an SGEI. From this per-
spective, the fact that terrestrial networks are not
mentioned expressly in the relevant legislation
would limit the discretion of theMember Statewhen
deciding how to organise an SGEI.
In relation to other aspects pertaining to the issue
of technology neutrality, the position taken by the
GC nuances that of the Commission. The authority
appeared to take the view in its decision that, by fail-
ing to endorse the principle of technology neutrali-
ty, a Member State would be committing a manifest
error that would vitiate the designation of a particu-
lar activity as anSGEI.While it did not have anyprac-
tical consequences, the GC appears to have ruled out
this interpretation of Altmark and Article 106(2)
TFEU. Even though it endorses, as a matter of prin-
ciple, the idea of technology neutrality, the GC holds,
contrary to the Commission, that the choice of a par-
ticular technology for the provision of an SGEI does
not, in all cases, amount to amanifest error of assess-
ment on the part of the Member State. According to
the GC, the Commission should have considered
whether the choice of a particular technology is ob-
jectively justified in light of the discretion enjoyed
by Member States in relation to the question.
43 See in this sense J Faull and A Nikpay, The EU Law of Competi-
tion (Oxford University Press 2014), para 6.149.
44 Case C-69/16 P: Appeal brought on 5 February 2016 by Cellnex
Telecom S.A. and Retevisión I, S.A. against the judgment of the
General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 26 November 2015
in Case T-541/13, Abertis Telecom S.A. and Retevisión I v Com-
mission [2016] OJ C118/17. Other challenges have been brought
against the GC judgments dismissing other challenges brought
against the Commission decision. See Case C-66/16 P Comu-
nidad Autónoma del País Vasco and Itelazpi v Commission,
pending; Case C-67/16 P Comunidad Autónoma de Cataluña and
CTTI v Commission, pending; Case C-68/16 P Navarra de Servi-
cios y Tecnologías v Commission, pending; Case C-70/16 P
Comunidad Autónoma de Galicia v Commission, pending; Case
C-81/16 P Spain v Commission, pending.
